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Abstract
We study the eﬃciency of credit market equilibria when ﬁnancial intermediaries cannot
observe the riskiness or the returns of potential investment projects. With loan ﬁnancing,
there is over-investment in high-return, high-risk projects and under-investment in low-
return, low-risk projects relative to the social optimum. If ﬁrms have the choice of equity
ﬁnance, there is unambiguously over-investment under reasonable conditions. The well-
known cases of Stiglitz and Weiss and of de Meza and Webb emerge as special cases. The
results are extended to allow for signaling and screening equilibria.
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edged.1. Introduction
It is well known that if lending intermediaries are forced by imperfect information to pool
high-quality and low-quality investment projects, an ineﬃcient volume of loans will be
made and there will be an a priori case for public intervention. However, whether too many
or too few loans will be extended depends upon the distribution of project characteristics
within the pool. The literature has focused on two special cases, which yield opposing
outcomes and policy implications. In one, due to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), intermediaries
know the expected return of projects, but not their riskiness. Projects of a given expected
return but diﬀerent risk must therefore be pooled. In equilibrium, too few projects of any
given expected return will be undertaken, leading to a policy prescription of a subsidy on
loans. In the other, due to de Meza and Webb (1987), intermediaries know the level of
returns that projects will yield if successful, but not the probability of success. Projects
with a given return if successful must be pooled. In this case, too many projects of a
given return will be funded, calling for a tax on loans. Furthermore, the Stiglitz-Weiss
case can lead to credit rationing (excess demand for loans) in equilibrium, whereas in the
de Meza-Webb case credit rationing cannot arise. And, if equity contracts were available
as an alternative to debt contracts, de Meza and Webb argue that they would be used in
the Stiglitz-Weiss case, but not the de Meza-Webb case. One is left with no clear policy
implications of the eﬀects of adverse selection in credit markets.
There is, however, no particular reason to suppose that intermediaries can distinguish
projects ex ante either by their expected return or by their return if successful. In general,
they might be unable to distinguish among projects with very diﬀerent patterns of returns
and riskiness. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the consequence of asymmet-
ric information in credit markets under a more general mix of characteristics than those
considered by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and de Meza and Webb (1987). In particular,
we suppose that pooled projects can have any general mix of returns and probabilities of
success. In this context, we study the eﬃciency properties of competitive ﬁnancial markets
and the implications for policy. When these more general project mixes are considered,
there will be over-investment in certain types of projects and under-investment in others
when ﬁnance takes the form of loans. However, we also show than this ambiguity can
disappear when ﬁrms are free to opt for either debt or equity ﬁnance. Under reason-
able assumptions, there will be unambiguously too many projects undertaken, with the
implication that a tax on projects ﬁnanced will be eﬃciency improving.
In this more general setting, we then consider some extensions to the simply pooling equi-
librium models, all of which involve introducing mechanisms that enhance the information
available to banks. The possibility of entrepreneurs signaling the quality of their projects
at a cost is analyzed. As well, the possibility of intermediaries separating projects by
oﬀering price-quantity contracts is considered.
12. The Basic Model
The model we use has a number of simple features, common to those used in the related
literature (e.g. de Meza and Webb, 1987). There is a continuum of potential entrepreneurs,
each with a project for which ﬁnance is required. All projects require a given amount of
capital K, which is the only input. A project’s return depends upon which of two states
of nature occurs—a good one or a bad one. The good state occurs with probability p and
yields a return R, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, 0 ≤ R<∞. The bad state occurs with probability
1−p and, for simplicity only, yields a return of zero. Projects are characterized by a (p,R)
combination that can diﬀer among projects. The characteristics of individual projects are
private information to the entrepreneur associated with each project.
The distribution of project returns among entrepreneurs is characterized by the joint dis-
tribution G(p,R) and its associated density function g(p,R). The distribution of p and
R can take arbitrary forms. In particular, there may be ranges where the density is zero,
g(p,R) = 0. The distribution of project returns G(p,R) is known both to the ﬁnancial
intermediaries and to the government.
Entrepreneurs diﬀer only in their project characteristics (p,R). All have the same initial
wealth W ≥ 0, and all have the same alternative income prospects y that they forgo if
they undertake the project. They require an amount of ﬁnance K − W ≡ B to undertake
their projects, and they obtain that from ﬁnancial intermediaries. Finance may take the
form of debt or equity depending on the circumstances. Intermediaries, in turn, obtain
their ﬁnance at a rate of return (or deposit rate) ρ, which is taken as ﬁxed by each
intermediary but may be variable for the capital market as a whole. All agents in the
economy—entrepreneurs, ﬁnancial intermediaries and the government—are risk-neutral.
Intermediaries are fully competitive, so earn zero expected proﬁts in equilibrium. Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) showed that in the kinds of models we are considering, credit rationing is
a possibility. In fact, that was the main focus of their paper. Since that is not our interest,
we assume that credit rationing does not in fact occur.
If project returns are not freely observable, it will be costly for intermediaries to verify
these returns. We assume that intermediaries can learn a project’s ex post return perfectly
by incurring a ﬁxed monitoring cost of c ≥ 0 per project monitored. With debt contracts,
monitoring will occur only if ﬁrms declare bankruptcy since in the absence of bankruptcy
the intermediary’s return is independent of the project return R. Indeed, the existence of
costly veriﬁcation can itself be the rationale for debt ﬁnancing (Williamson, 1987).
3. Debt Finance
We begin, following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and de Meza and Webb (1987), with the case
where projects are ﬁnanced by debt. To avoid issues of internal ﬁnancing and collateral,
2which we take up later, we assume in this section that entrepreneurs have no initial wealth
(W = 0). To undertake their projects, they require an amount of loan ﬁnance B = K,
which they can borrow at the interest rate r from an intermediary, here a bank. The net
expected proﬁt of an entrepreneur, given r, is:
π(p,R,r)=p(R − (1 + r)B) − y (1)
This is increasing in p if R>(1+r)B—which will be the case for all funded projects—and
in R (and decreasing in r). Given r, there will be a set of marginal entrepreneurs whose
projects satisfy π(p,R,r) = 0. This equation can be depicted as an iso-proﬁt curve for the
marginal entrepreneurs in (p,R)−space. The slope and curvature of this iso-proﬁt curve






























R − (1 + r)B
p2 > 0 (2)
where the signs follow from the fact that π(p,R,r) = 0 implies R>(1 + r)B. All
entrepreneurs whose projects have combinations of p and R to the northeast of the iso-
proﬁt curve will demand a loan, while those southwest will not. Note that since π is
decreasing in r, an increase in r will cause the iso-proﬁt curve to shift outwards.
With debt ﬁnance, entrepreneurs will be unable to repay their loans in a bad state, so
will go bankrupt. If project outcomes cannot be observed by the banks, projects declaring
bankruptcy will be monitored. Since we assume that monitoring perfectly reveals the
project’s outcome, only truly bankrupt ﬁrms will declare bankruptcy.1 Assuming that the
government has no better information than the banks, these ex post monitoring costs will
be socially necessary expenditures. Given that, the net social beneﬁt of undertaking a
project with characteristics (p,R) is as follows:
S(p,R)=pR − (1 − p)c − (1 + ρ)B − y (3)
This is increasing in both p and R, and is independent of the interest rate r. A project
will be worth undertaking from a social point of view if S(p,R) ≥ 0. An iso-beneﬁt curve
for the marginally socially proﬁtable project is deﬁned by S(p,R) = 0. Diﬀerentiating, we































p2 > 0 (4)
1 In a more general analysis, the possibility of imperfect monitoring could be considered. This
would aﬀect the nature of contracts oﬀered to ﬁrms, which must be generous enough to preclude
false declarations of bankruptcy.
3Thus, the iso-beneﬁt curve also slopes downward and is convex to the origin. All projects
to its northeast ought to be undertaken from a social point of view, while those southwest
should not be.






















so the iso-beneﬁt curve is steeper than the iso-proﬁt curve. Intuitively, since entrepreneurs
only bear the cost of ﬁnance in the event of success while society bears it in either state,
the increment in R needed to compensate them for a reduced probability of success is less
that what society must be compensated. That is, entrepreneurs face no downside risk so
discount the costs of a lower probability of success. The intersection point can be found
by subtracting the iso-beneﬁt expression from the iso-proﬁt expression to obtain:
p∗ =
(1 + ρ)B + c
(1 + r)B + c
(5)
The value of p∗ will decrease with an increase in r: the iso-proﬁt curve shifts outwards
while the iso-beneﬁt curve is unaﬀected. Figure 1 illustrates the determination of p∗ for a
given value of r, with the cross-hatched areas representing project-types that either should
be undertaken but are not (the under-investment area), or projects that are undertaken
but should not be (the over-investment area). For p>p ∗, there are socially proﬁtable
projects that do not enter, while for p<p ∗, there will be entry of socially unproﬁtable
projects. This reﬂects the fact that increments of p are of relatively more value socially
than to entrepreneurs since a share of the proceeds of successful projects accrues to banks.
The set of available projects among which intermediaries (and the government) are unable
to distinguish—so they must be pooled at the same interest rate—can be anywhere in
(p,R)−space. To the extent that they are found in the two cross-hatched areas, ineﬃciency
will result.2
The equilibrium in Figure 1 depends on the value of r. To complete the description of
the market outcome, the equilibrium value of r is determined by the zero-expected-proﬁt
condition applying to the competitive banks (all of whom are identical):3
Π = p(1 + r)B − (1 − p)c − (1 + ρ)B = 0 (6)
2 Mankiw (1986) makes a similar observation for a model in which there are no monitoring costs.
He points out moreover that loan markets may ‘collapse’ in the sense that there may be no
equilibrium in which loans are made.
3 We are implicitly assuming that banks do not incur any real costs of operation, as is common
in the literature. Adding bank operating costs would have no eﬀect on the analysis.
4where p is the expected probability of success among all projects being funded by the
banks. By rearranging this zero-proﬁt condition and using (5), we obtain:
p =
(1 + ρ)B + c
(1 + r)B + c
= p∗ (50)
Thus, the equilibrium interest rate will be set such that the value of the expected proba-
bility of success of all accepted projects p is equal to the value of p at which the iso-beneﬁt
and iso-proﬁt curves intersect. The iso-proﬁt curve adjusts with a change in r until this is
the case. This relation proves useful in what follows.
Consider now the policy implications of these results. To get some insight into the kinds
of policies that would ensure that all socially proﬁtable projects are undertaken, we ﬁrst
characterize sets of policies that could in principle convert the expression for private proﬁts
(1) into that for social proﬁts (3). One such set of policies can be obtained by letting ∆1
be a common tax imposed on all successful ﬁrms and ∆2 be a common tax imposed if
successful or not. With such a tax system, after-tax expected project proﬁts become,
using (1):
π(p,R,r)=p(R − (1 + r)B − ∆1) − ∆2 − y
Then, this expression reduces to social proﬁts (3) by setting:
∆1 = −c − (1 + r)B and ∆2 = c +( 1+ρ)B
Note that these taxes would in principle be easy to implement since they do not require in-
formation on individual probabilities of success p or returns R. The government only needs
to know whether a project has been successful. Under such a scheme, all entrepreneurs
would be taxed ex ante and subsidized in the event of success at the same rates ∆1 and
∆2. Unfortunately, the ex ante tax that the government would have to extract from all
entrepreneurs up front would exceed the value of the loan (∆2 >B ). If the entrepreneurs
were able to pay this tax, they would not need outside ﬁnancing in the ﬁrst place. There-
fore, this informationally parsimonious policy is not feasible in the current circumstances.
An optimal policy that avoids this infeasibility problem would be one that taxes or sub-
sidizes proﬁtable ﬁrms ex post based on their project characteristics, assuming that the
government can acquire that information, say, by ﬁrms reporting it to the tax authorities.
To make the iso-proﬁt curve for the marginal project coincide with the iso-beneﬁt curve, a
non-linear progressive tax would have to be imposed on projects with a high R (low p)—for
whom there is over-investment—and progressive subsidy on those with a low R (high p). To
be more precise, let T(p,R) be the tax imposed on a ﬁrm with given (p,R), so after-tax prof-
its become π(p,R,r)=p(R−(1+r)B−T(p,R))−y.I fT(p,R) is set so that after-tax proﬁts
equal social proﬁts in (3), we have p(R−(1+r)B−T(p,R))−y = pR−(1−p)c−(1+ρ)B−y.
This yields an optimal tax of
T(p,R)=T(p) = [(1 − p)c +( 1+ρ − p(1 + r))B]/p
5with T 0(p) < 0 and T(p∗) = 0, so T(p) > 0 for all p<p ∗, and T(p) < 0 for all p>p ∗.
This optimal tax is informationally demanding. If the tax authorities cannot learn p or
R, the best that can be done is a general tax or subsidy at the same rate on all loans or
deposits. Whether it is a tax or subsidy depends on the mix of available projects (and
that may be hard for the government to know as well). Given that there will be over-
investment in some projects and under-investment in others, applying a tax at a common
rate will generally not yield the ﬁrst-best optimum (except in special cases such as the one
considered next).
The above analysis applies for any general distribution of feasible projects G(p,R). Let us
now consider two special cases that restrict the set of available projects: those of de Meza
and Webb (1987) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). The equilibrium outcomes and policy
implications for the latter case are not as straightforward and unambiguous as the existing
literature seems to imply.
The de Meza-Webb Case
In this case, project returns are assumed to be common knowledge, so intermediaries
are able to classify projects according to their project return R. To consider this case,
we can focus on a particular value of R. The same analysis will apply for other sets of
projects with a diﬀerent return R, although of course diﬀerent interest rates r will apply
for diﬀerent values of R. Geometrically, the set of projects available are distributed along
a horizontal line for the given R. The form of the distribution does not matter for our
analysis, although it is convenient to assume g(p,R) > 0 for all p over the range of interest.
Let the line of available projects intersect the equilibrium iso-proﬁt locus at ˜ p. To the right
of the intersection line, projects enter, and to the left they do not. Figure 1 illustrates this
case for projects with a given return R.
It is clear that when the banks’ zero-proﬁt condition is satisﬁed, this intersection point ˜ p
is to the left of p∗, so there is a range where some projects are funded that are socially
unproﬁtable—the de Meza-Webb (1987) over-investment result. To see this, recall that
the entrepreneurs’ proﬁts π(p,R,r) are increasing in p. Given that R is ﬁxed, it follows
that there will be a marginal project with probability of success ˜ p, and all projects with
p ≥ ˜ p will be undertaken. This implies that the average probability of success of funded
projects satisﬁes p>˜ p, implying that p∗ > ˜ p, so the intersection point of the ﬁxed-R line
lies to the left of p∗.
Algebraically, this over-investment result can be shown as follows. The marginal en-
trepreneur’s zero-net-proﬁt condition and the banks’ zero-expected-proﬁt condition are
by (1) and (6) respectively:
˜ p(R − (1 + r)B) − y =0
6p(1 + r)B − (1 − p)c − (1 + ρ)B =0
Adding these expressions and rearranging we obtain an expression for the social proﬁtabil-
ity of the marginal project, S(˜ p):
˜ pR − (1 − ˜ p)c − (1 + ρ)B − y
| {z }
S(˜ p)
=( ˜ p − p)((1 + r)B − c) (7)
Therefore, since p>˜ p in the de Meza-Webb case, the marginal project has negative social
beneﬁts. Since social beneﬁts are increasing in p, there is too much entry of low-p projects.
This excess entry can be corrected by a uniform tax applied either on all successful projects
(of this given R class), on bank loans, or on bank deposits provided the government has
the same information about projects as do the banks. In fact, setting the optimal tax is
not straightforward. Available projects can take on many diﬀerent values of R, and the
banks will be able to pool them into separate classes, each with an equilibrium of the sort
illustrated in Figure 1. The size of the distortion between social and private returns can
vary by R class, so the optimal tax rates on loans in each class will vary. Moreover, they
will vary in a non-systematic way depending on the distribution of projects in each R class.
The Stiglitz-Weiss Case
In this case, intermediaries are assumed to be able to identify projects by their expected
return. Within a given class of such projects, the set of available projects satisﬁes pR = k,
where k is a constant. The distribution of available projects within a class pR = k can
take any form. For convenience, we again assume that g(p,R) > 0 for all projects over the
relevant range on p.




































Therefore, the slope of the locus of projects available in the Stiglitz-Weiss case with c>0
is between the slope of the iso-proﬁt locus and the iso-beneﬁt locus, although its exact
position depends on the value of k, that is, the class of projects under consideration.
In this case where pR is ﬁxed, entrepreneur’s expected proﬁts π(p,R,r)—given by (1)—are
decreasing in p, so all projects with p ≤ ˜ p are undertaken, where ˜ p is again the point of
intersection between the Stiglitz-Weiss locus of available projects and the iso-proﬁt locus of
7the marginal projects. Therefore, it must be that p<˜ p. Thus, since p = p∗, the marginal
project lies to the right of p∗ along the iso-proﬁt locus. This implies that the locus of
available projects intersects the iso-proﬁt locus to the right of p∗. Figure 2 illustrates this
case for a particular value of k = pR.4
We can infer the following from Figure 2. There are three ranges along the locus of available
projects delineated by where it intersects the iso-proﬁt locus (˜ p) and where it intersects
the iso-beneﬁt locus, denoted po. From a social point of view, only projects with p ≥ po
should be undertaken. Consider the social proﬁtability of projects in the three ranges:
i. p>˜ p: Projects in this range are socially proﬁtable, but are not undertaken.
ii. po ≤ p ≤ ˜ p: Projects in this range are socially optimal and are undertaken
iii. p<p o: Projects in this range are socially unproﬁtable, but are undertaken.5
Thus, too few high-p projects are undertaken—all those the highest p—and too many low-p
projects are undertaken—those with the lowest p. The policy implications are obviously
ambiguous.
It is worth contrasting these results with the case when there are no ex post monitoring
costs (c = 0), as was assumed by Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) and recounted in both Mankiw
(1986) and de Meza and Webb (1987). In this case, the slopes of the iso-beneﬁt locus (4)
and the locus of available projects pR = k would be the same, −R/p. Both are rectangular
hyperbolas so are parallel to one another in p,R−space. The iso-proﬁt locus is again given






























Since the available projects locus is steeper negative than the iso-proﬁt locus, it intersects
the latter from above. Since the iso-beneﬁt locus and the locus of available projects are
now parallel, the range of over-investment in Figure 2 (p<p o) disappears. Projects with
lower p will still be undertaken, while those with higher p will not. The expected return
on projects ﬁnanced p—still given by (50), the intersection point of the iso-beneﬁt and
iso-proﬁt curves—is less than that for the marginal project ˜ p. Since all projects should
be undertaken, there will be under-investment, as shown by de Meza and Webb (1987).
Algebraically, S(˜ p) > 0 by (7) since ˜ p>p.
The possibility of these various outcomes makes policy prescriptions diﬃcult. Whatever
the magnitude of monitoring costs c, Figures 1 and 2 indicate that in general, it would
4 In this ﬁgure, we are assuming that k is such that ˜ p is in the interior.
5 The existence of this range depends on c being high enough. As shown below, if c is zero, the
locus of available projects and the iso-beneﬁt lines are parallel.
8be desirable to tax high-R, low-p projects and subsidize low-R, high-p. However, even
if the government has the same information as the banks and can observe the expected
project returns pR, it cannot distinguish within any given category projects with diﬀerent
characteristics (p,R), so it cannot target taxes and subsidies appropriately.
4. Equity Finance
Suppose now that intermediaries provide ﬁnance to entrepreneurs in exchange for a share
of the project returns. Let σ be the share of a project’s returns going to the entrepreneur,
so the remaining (1 − σ) goes to the intermediary. Now all projects must be monitored
since returns must be veriﬁed in both the good and the bad states. The expected net
proﬁts of entrepreneurs are:
π(p,R,σ)=σpR− y
Since this is increasing in the expected return pR, entrepreneurs with the higher expected
returns will enter. The iso-proﬁt condition for the marginal entrepreneur becomes σpR−





All projects with pR ≥ f pR apply for ﬁnancing.
The iso-beneﬁt locus in R,p−space is now given by S(p,R)=pR − c − (1 + ρ)B − y =0 ,
which diﬀers slightly from (3) since now all projects must be monitored. Along this locus,
expected returns are constant and denoted (pR)o, where:
(pR)o =( 1+ρ)B + c + y (10)
All projects with pR ≥ (pR)o should be undertaken from a social point of view. Note that
both the iso-proﬁt and the iso-beneﬁt loci are rectangular hyperbolas deﬁned by (9) and
(10). We need then only to compare f pR with (pR)o to see if too many or too few projects
are undertaken. To do so, we use the intermediaries’ zero-expected-proﬁt condition to
obtain the equilibrium share σ oﬀered by intermediaries in return for providing ﬁnance B:
(1 − σ)pR − (1 + ρ)B − c =0 = ⇒ σ =
pR − (1 + ρ)B − c
pR
(11)
Substituting this into the iso-proﬁt condition (9) and rearranging, we obtain:
f pR = y +
f pR
pR
((1 + ρ)B + c) <y+( 1+ρ)B + c =( pR)o (12)
9Therefore, the iso-proﬁt curve lies uniformly inside the iso-beneﬁt curve, so too many
projects are unambiguously undertaken in the market equilibrium (unlike with the case of
debt ﬁnance).
Note that in order to implement equity ﬁnance, it must be possible to observe R ex post.
That being so, the equity contract could in principle be made conditional on R. We return
to the consequences of that below.
5. Choice of Debt versus Equity Finance
If returns can be observed ex post, the choice between debt and equity ﬁnance should be
endogenous. In this section, we assume that competition among ﬁnancial intermediaries
determines which projects are ﬁnanced by debt and which by equity. Suppose (following
Hellmann and Stiglitz, 20006) that there are two sorts of ﬁnancial intermediaries: those
that provide debt ﬁnance and those that provide equity ﬁnance. Both are risk-neutral and
competitive. Entrepreneurs can choose their most preferred form of ﬁnance.
Consider ﬁrst entrepreneurs’ expected net proﬁts under debt and equity ﬁnance. Analogous
to the above, they are as follows (with superscripts added to indicate debt and equity
ﬁnance):
π
D(p,R,r)=p(R − (1 + r)B) − y, π
E(p,R,σ)=σpR− y (13)
As before, deﬁne iso-proﬁt curves for debt and equity ﬁnance, given r and σ,b y




















The iso-proﬁt curve for debt is therefore ﬂatter than that for equity, so intersects it from
below (assuming, as we do, the intersection is in the interior). Given r and σ, the inter-





If ﬁrms have a choice between forms of ﬁnance given r and σ, they will choose debt if:
πD(p,R,r)− πE(p,R,σ)=p((1 − σ)R − (1 + r)B) > 0= ⇒ R> ˆ R
For R< ˆ R, equity ﬁnance will be chosen.
6 The focus of Hellmann and Stiglitz was on credit rationing rather than ineﬃciency in the
number of projects ﬁnanced. As mentioned, we are ignoring the possibility of credit rationing.
10Figure 3 illustrates the projects that will apply for ﬁnance of one sort or another, and
which type of ﬁnance will be preferred. The horizontal line at ˆ R =( 1+r)B/(1 − σ)
divides the project space into those that would be ﬁnanced by debt and those by equity.
All projects that are above the horizontal line and to the right of the debt iso-proﬁt curve
are ﬁnanced by debt. All projects that are below the horizontal line and to the right of the
iso-proﬁt curve for equity are ﬁnanced by equity. Those to the southwest of both curves
are not ﬁnanced at all. The intuition is that projects with high R (and low p) take debt
ﬁnance because all the residual of a good outcome goes to the entrepreneur. Low risk-low
return projects take equity ﬁnance.
The social net beneﬁts are deﬁned as before, taking account of the fact that with debt
ﬁnance, monitoring is only necessary in the event of bankruptcy. Iso-beneﬁt curves for
debt and equity ﬁnance are:
SD(p,R)=pR − (1 − p)c − (1 + ρ)B − y =0
SE(p,R)=pR − c − (1 + ρ)B − y = SD(p,R) − pc = 0 (15)




















Thus, SE(p,R) = 0 will be a rectangular hyperbola, like the iso-proﬁt locus of en-
trepreneurs under equity ﬁnancing. By the same argument as in Section 4, the iso-beneﬁt
lies outside the iso-proﬁt locus for equity ﬁnanced projects. The iso-beneﬁt curve is steeper
for debt ﬁnanced projects than for equity-ﬁnanced projects. Moreover, as (15) implies, if
monitoring costs c are not too large, the iso-beneﬁt curve SD = 0 will intersect the iso-
proﬁt curve πD =0a tR< ˆ R as shown in Figure 3.7 If that is the case, the iso-beneﬁt curve
for debt ﬁnanced projects SD = 0 will lie outside the iso-proﬁt curve πD = 0 whenever
debt is chosen (R> ˆ R).
The implication is that, for c not too large, there will be too many projects ﬁnanced
both by debt and equity. Thus, it seems that allowing for both debt and equity ﬁnance
7 More generally, at the intersection point πD =0=SD, R∗ =( 1+r)B +[ ( 1+r)B + c]y/[(1 +
ρ)B + c]. Combining this with expression (14) for ˆ R, and using (11) to determine σ, we obtain
after some manipulation:
R





(1 + ρ)B + c
where (pR)Eo is the expected return along the iso-beneﬁt curve SE = 0 and pR
E
is expected
proﬁts along the iso-proﬁt curve πE = 0. Since (pR)Eo < pR
E
, R∗ < ˆ R if cy is small enough.
11removes the ambiguity in the direction of the distortion we found earlier, at least with
small c. There will too many projects ﬁnanced by both debt and equity, calling for a tax
on the ﬁnancing of projects. Of course, the optimal tax will not be uniform across projects
of diﬀerent p,R characteristics, but this cannot be implemented without the government
having better information about projects that intermediaries. Failing that, the best we
can say is that some tax on projects of all types will be welfare-improving.
6. Contracts Contingent on Ex Post Returns
If intermediaries can monitor project returns, they should be able to oﬀer contracts that
are contingent on R. In this section, we investigate the consequences of these contracts.
Our analysis is simpliﬁed by continuing to assume that each project has only two possible
outcomes, zero and R. If there is more than one state with positive returns, the analysis
becomes much more complicated.8
To allow for general contract forms, let α + βR be the return to the bank ex post, given
R. (Of course, α and β will vary with R, but since our analysis is for any given R, our
notation ignores that dependency for simplicity.) Thus, α could be like a debt component
and β an equity one. Social net beneﬁts are given by S(p,R)=pR−c−(1+ρ)B −y since
all projects must be monitored. Expected entrepreneurial proﬁts are:
π(p,R,β,α)=p((1 − β)R − α) − y (16)
Note that this is increasing in p for projects with non-negative proﬁts. For projects of









The contracts oﬀered by intermediaries will in equilibrium satisfy the zero-expected-proﬁt
condition for any given R:












8 There may be an implementation problem with contracts contingent on R since there is no
assurance that banks will reveal R truthfully to third parties, such as the courts.
12Since dα/dβ are the same for banks and ﬁrms, debt and equity are perfect substitutes.
Banks will choose α + βR until Π = 0, and this determines p.
Consider now the eﬃciency of the marginal project ˜ p. The zero-expected-proﬁt condition
for this project from (16) is:
π(˜ p,R,α,β)=˜ p((1 − β)R − α) − y =0
Combining this with the intermediaries’ zero-expected-proﬁt condition (17) yields:
˜ pR − c − (1 + ρ)B − y
| {z }
S(˜ p)
=( ˜ p − p)(α + βR)
Since expected proﬁts are increasing in p, p>˜ p. Therefore, S(˜ p) < 0 indicating that
there is overinvestment, as in the de Meza-Webb case. Eﬃciency would be increased by
taxing projects. In the full optimum, the tax would have to vary with R, but not generally
monotonically. The value of α + βR is contingent on R but not in a straightforward way.
In particular, p will diﬀer by R depending on the distribution of ﬁrms over p, given R.
7. Extensions
In this section, we consider some extensions to the basic model. Most of the extensions
involve enhancing the information available to the banks. We begin with the case where
entrepreneurs are able to signal the quality of their projects to intermediaries at a cost. We
then turn to cases in which the intermediaries may be able to separate projects of diﬀerent
types by separating contracts. For simplicity, attention is restricted to loan ﬁnancing.
Signaling by Entrepreneurs
Suppose entrepreneurs can signal their types perfectly by incurring a ﬁxed cost f. Signaling
of this sort is considered by Fuest et al (2003) for the de Meza-Webb and Stiglitz project
distributions. Here we consider it for the general case. Potential entrepreneurs now choose
from three options: signal and take a loan, not signal and take a loan, and not take
a loan. For entrepreneurs that signal, banks learn perfectly their type and can charge a
type-speciﬁc interest rate. The bank zero-expected-proﬁt condition—the analogue of (6)—
implies that the interest rate charged to them (assuming for simplicity c = 0) satisﬁes
1+r =( 1 + ρ)/p,s or is decreasing in p. For those who choose not to signal, the
pooled interest rate obtained from the bank zero-expected-proﬁt condition (6) satisﬁes
(1 + r)pn =1+ρ, where pn is the average probability of success of funded projects of
entrepreneurs that do not signal.
Entrepreneurial expected proﬁts for those who do and do not signal are then given by:
With signaling : πs(p,R)=pR − (1 + ρ)B − y − f
13With no signaling : π
n(p,R,r)=p(R − (1 + ρ)B/p
n) − y
Entrepreneurs who take a loan will signal if πs ≥ πn,o r
(1 + ρ)(p/pn − 1)B − f ≥ 0 (18)
Denote the probability of success of the marginal entrepreneur who signals by ˆ p, which is
the value of p such that (18) is satisﬁed with equality, or:







Entrepreneurs with p ≥ ˆ p>pn will signal and obtain expected proﬁts πs(p,R), while those
with p<ˆ p who take a loan will not signal and will obtain expected proﬁts πn(p,R,r).
Figure 4 illustrates this for the general case. In the absence of signaling, the average
probability of success of funded projects is p. Signaling by the high-p entrepreneurs causes
the interest rate to rise for non-signaled projects, since this pool now has a lower expected
probability of success, pn < p. The iso-proﬁt curve for pooled projects—those with p<ˆ p—
shifts parallel outward from π(p,R) = 0 as shown. However, for p>ˆ p, the iso-proﬁt curve
to πs(p,R) = 0 is a rectangular hyperbola pR =( 1+ρ)B + y + f, so parallel to the
iso-beneﬁt curve, S(p,R) = 0. The area of over-investment will fall, but the area of under-
investment may well rise. Moreover, the deadweight cost of signaling is incurred. On
balance, therefore, the ability of entrepreneurs to signal their quality may or may not be
welfare-improving. Equivalently, there may be too much or too little signaling compared
with the socially optimal amount. Nonetheless, the qualitative results of the non-signaling
case carry over. There will be too many low-p and too few high-p projects undertaken,
and, unless the government has enough information to be able to target tax rates by p,
the optimal direction of intervention is ambiguous.
The de Meza-Webb case follows from this general analysis, and is depicted in Figure 4
for a given return R. In the absence of signaling, we have p>˜ p. Signaling will peel
oﬀ the highest p projects, causing p fall to pn and the pooled interest rate r to rise. As
long as some projects do not signal in equilibrium, we have ˆ p>pn > ˜ pn, where ˜ pn is
the probability of success of the marginal project. Since the pooled interest rate rises,
˜ pn > ˜ p, so there will be fewer projects funded. However, as long as some pooled projects
remain, there will be more projects than is socially optimal, by the same reasoning as
before. Signaling itself will have ambiguous eﬀects on welfare. Fewer projects will be
funded, which is a good thing in the de Meza-Webb case. But, costs of signaling will be
incurred, which is wasteful: those who signal would have been funded anyway. The eﬀect
of signaling on them is simply to reduce the interest rate they face, which is a pure transfer
14from the banks. On balance, the welfare eﬀect of signaling is ambiguous.9 However, the
policy implications are not aﬀected by signaling. As in the de Meza-Webb case without
signaling, it will be eﬃcient to tax loans or funded projects. As Fuest et al (2003) argue, a
tax will reduce the number of lowest-p projects funded, which is welfare-improving. It will
also reduce the number of entrepreneurs who chose to signal, which reduces social costs.
The reason is that with the lowest-p projects leaving the pool, the interest rate on pooled
projects falls, causing ˆ p to rise.
In the Stiglitz-Weiss case (assuming that all projects are socially beneﬁcial), either ˆ p>˜ p>
p or ˜ p>ˆ p>p.I f˜ p>ˆ p>p, all projects are funded, which is good. The need for policy
to discourage entry of projects is supplanted. However, the cost of signaling is incurred so
the social optimum is not achieved. In fact, as in the de Meza-Webb case, signaling might
be either welfare improving or welfare deteriorating.
Diﬀerent Internal Financing Requirements
Suppose now that all entrepreneurs have some amount of initial wealth W. We consider
ﬁrst whether it is possible to separate entrepreneurs by requiring them to provide diﬀerent
amounts of own ﬁnance in return for diﬀerent interest rates. To avoid multi-dimensional
screening problems, we assume that ﬁrms diﬀer in p alone (analogous to the de Meza-Webb
case). It turns out that a pooling equilibrium will be the outcome even in this simple case.
Let K − B ≤ W be the amount of internal ﬁnance, so the loan is B ≥ K − W. The
expected proﬁts of becoming an entrepreneur for a type-p entrepreneur are now:
π(r, B)=p(R − (1 + r)B) − (1 + ρ)(K − B) − y (19)
where (1 + ρ)(K − B) is the opportunity cost of the entrepreneur’s own funds used in the
ﬁrm. Note ﬁrst that:
∂π
∂B




Thus, if 1+r =( 1+ρ)/p, entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between internal ﬁnance and loans,
while they prefer loans over internal ﬁnance if the interest rate is less than that, and vice
versa. Deﬁne r∗ by 1 + r∗ =( 1+ρ)/p. This would be the interest rate oﬀered to the ﬁrm
in a full information (ﬁrst-best) setting. The slope and curvature of iso-proﬁt curves is












p(1 + r) − (1 + ρ)
pB
> <0a sr∗> <r
9 Fuest et al (2003) show that if ﬁrms are distributed uniformly over p, signaling will be excessive.

















p(1 + r) − (1 + ρ)
pB2
> <0a sr> <r∗
Figure 5 depicts four indiﬀerence curves for each of two ﬁrms with probabilities of success
p2 >p 1, with those for p1 drawn as dashes. In the full information outcome, the ﬁrms
face interest rates r∗
1 and r∗
2, where their indiﬀerence curves are parallel indicating that
the level of loans within the admissible bounds K ≥ B ≥ K − W is irrelevant. However,
this is not implementable if banks cannot distinguish the two types of ﬁrms. Moreover, a
separating equilibrium will not be possible in this case since any contract oﬀered to type
2’s at the interest rate r = r∗
2 will be preferred by the type 1’s to their ﬁrst best contract
at the interest rate r∗
1 (i.e., any contract below the indiﬀerence curve r1 = r∗
1 is preferred
by the type 1’s). Instead a pooling contract must be oﬀered, and the only pooling contract
that is an equilibrium will be that involving the minimal loan B = K − W. A pooling
contract with a higher level of B, such as that B1 will be broken a bank oﬀering a contract
with lower B, thereby siphoning oﬀ the high-p entrepreneurs and leaving the previous
contract with a loss for the banks. Thus, simply allowing entrepreneurs to have a given
initial amount of wealth W>0 will not change the previous results.
Diﬀerent Collateral Requirements
On the other hand, if entrepreneurs have initial wealth, it is possible for the banks to
separate projects using diﬀerential collateral requirements, at least in the simple case
where ﬁrms diﬀer in one dimension only. Consider again the de Meza-Webb case where
ﬁrms diﬀer in p, but have the same R. Let C be the amount of collateral that the ﬁrm
must pay in the event of bankruptcy. Given wealth W, collateral is limited by 0 ≤ C ≤ W.
The expected proﬁts of the ﬁrm become:
π(r, C)=p(R − (1 + r)B) − (1 − p)C − y (20)
Note that ∂π/∂C < 0, so ﬁrms dislike collateral. The possibility of a separating equilibrium












Since this slope is independent of both r and C, iso-proﬁt lines are straight ones. To verify















Thus, the higher-p ﬁrm has ﬂatter iso-proﬁt curves. This gives rise to the possibility of
separating contracts.
16Figure 6 illustrates this for the case of two types with p2 >p 1. With no collateral, type
1’s would prefer the interest rate appropriate for the type 2’s, r2. It is possible to design
a contract for the high-p types to separate them from the low-p potential mimickers. The
optimal separating contract is given by (r∗
2,C∗
2) such that the type 1’s are just indiﬀerent
between this contract and their no-collateral ﬁrst-best interest rate interest rate r1. The
interest rates charged to the entrepreneurs depend on the banks’ zero-expected-proﬁt con-
ditions. For the low-p types who have no collateral, p1(1 + r1)=1+ρ. For the high-p
types, the interest rate satisﬁes p2(1 + r∗
2)B +( 1− p2)C∗
2 − (1 + ρ)B = 0. This interest
rate is less than the full information one r∗
2 because of the eﬀect of collateral. However,
this separating contract may or may not be an equilibrium in the Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) sense. Only if the pooling interest rate exceeds ˆ r—that is, if there is a high enough
proportion of high-risk types—will a separating equilibrium exist.
Suppose now there are a large number of potential types of entrepreneurs, who diﬀer in
their probability of success. As above, the single-crossing property will apply between
any pair of probability types, with iso-proﬁt curves being ﬂatter for higher p’s. Assuming
that separating equilibria exist, as many types of contracts will be oﬀered as probability
types if there is no bunching (partial pooling).10 Incentive constraints for a given p-type
entrepreneur will be binding only on the adjacent entrepreneur with the next lowest p.
Proﬁts will be increasing monotonically with p. If there is a pool of potential entrepreneurs,
entry will occur until the proﬁts of the last one fall to zero. Since the lowest-p entrepreneurs
face no incentive constraint (analogous to type-1 in Figure 6), the marginal entrepreneurs
obtain their ﬁrst-best level of ﬁnance, and the earn zero expected proﬁts. Since the banks
are able to oﬀer them a separate contract, the probability of success of the marginal
entrepreneur will also reﬂect the probability of repayment to the bank, or ˜ p = p in the
notation of basic model. This implies that social proﬁtability of the marginal entrepreneur’s
project will also be zero (S(˜ p) = 0). There is therefore no need to intervene to ensure that
the optimal number of entrepreneurs receive project ﬁnancing.
Diﬀerent Capital Requirements
Suppose now that project size K is variable, and that project returns are given by the
function R(K), where R0 > 0 >R 00. If entrepreneurs diﬀer only by their probability of
success p, all would choose the same level of K for any given r so could not be separated
by the banks. To make the case of variable capital size interesting, we assume that en-
trepreneurs also vary by an ability parameter a. And, to avoid multi-dimensional screening
problems, we assume that abilities and probabilities of success are perfectly correlated: all
10 For an analysis of separating equilibria with many diﬀerent types of agents, see Guesnerie and
Seade (1982). We assume away bunching since it has no eﬀect on the qualitative results of
interest to us.
17entrepreneurs of a given ability a have the same probability of success p. For exposi-
tional purposes, suppose initially there are only two types of entrepreneurs, diﬀering in
their probability of success pi (i =1 ,2) and their ability ai, both of these characteristics
being private information to the entrepreneur. Type 2’s are taken to be more able, so
that a2 >a 1, but alternative possibilities on their relative chances of success (p1> <p2) can
apply. Later we consider the case where entrepreneurs can take on many diﬀerent abilities
in order to address the issue of whether the an eﬃcient number of projects ﬁnanced.
Output of type i if successful is aiR(K). In the event of failure, output is zero, as above.
Assuming entrepreneurs have no initial wealth (so K = B), the expected proﬁt of a type
i can be written:
πi = pi(aiR(B) − (1 + r)B) − y (21)
Preferences of the two types over (r, B) contracts can then be represented by iso-proﬁt
contours. By diﬀerentiating (21), these have an inverted-U shape, with the direction of
increasing proﬁt being downwards and with the curves for the high-ability types peaking,
at any given r, to the right of those of with low ability. Moreover, the single-crossing
property applies such that at each point in (r, B)–space, the slope of the iso-proﬁt contour
of the high-ability type exceeds that of the low-ability type. Given this, the possibility
arises of a separating equilibrium in which the two types are oﬀered, and select, diﬀerent
(r, B) contracts (as in Boadway et al, 1998). In any such equilibrium, each contract must
earn zero expected proﬁts for the bank (otherwise it would be vulnerable to entry). Since
expected proﬁts on a type i contract are simply pi(1 + ri)Bi − (1 + ρ)Bi (assuming no ex





where ri is the actuarially fair interest rate associated with pi.
Equilibrium is characterized by the banks oﬀering contracts (ri,B i) which maximize ex-
pected proﬁts subject to this zero-expected condition for each type, the participation
constraint that πi ≥ 0 for both types, and the incentive constraints that each type prefer
the contract intended for it, so that
aiR(Bi) − (1 + ri)Bi ≥ aiR(Bk) − (1 + rk)Bk i,k =1 ,2,k6= i
Note that in the ﬁrst-best allocation, each type maximizes piaiR(Bi) − (1 + ρ)Bi,s o
that aiR0(Bi)=( 1+ρ)/pi, with strict concavity of R(K) ensuring that the participation
constraint is satisﬁed. Diagrammatically, this corresponds to a point of tangency between
an iso-proﬁt contour of type i and a horizontal line at the corresponding actuarially fair
interest rate ri.
18Suppose, for illustrative purposes, that the high-ability types are also the more likely
to succeed, so that p2 >p 1. And, assume that the probabilities of success are suﬃ-
ciently diﬀerent that the incentive constraints are not all slack. The relevant separating
equilibrium—assuming there are enough type 1’s so it exists—is shown in Figure 7. The
low-ability types are oﬀered their ﬁrst-best contract at α but the high-ability types are
required to over-invest at β relative to their ﬁrst-best level at γ. Policy can improve on
this outcome. To see how, note ﬁrst that there would be a social gain if the high-ability
types could be induced to accept a contract at δ (slightly north-west of β, and on the same
iso-proﬁt contour of the low-ability type) rather than β, since this would bring their level
of investment closer to the ﬁrst-best level. The diﬃculty is that although the pair (α,δ)
is incentive compatible it cannot be sustained as a no-intervention equilibrium because δ
(since it involves an interest rate higher than r2) leaves the banks with positive proﬁts.
But the government can soak up these proﬁts by imposing a tax on the interest payments
associated with the high-ability contract. More precisely, by charging a tax on the low-
interest loans equal to the vertical distance between δ and β, the government can induce
banks, solving the problem described above, to oﬀer the contract at δ, and they will earn
zero net proﬁts by doing so. This tax makes high-ability entrepreneurs worse oﬀ, of course,
so that this argument will fail if it leads to a violation of their participation constraint.
It is readily veriﬁed, however, that their participation constraint is not binding in the
no-intervention equilibrium, and so will continue to hold for a suﬃciently small tax. The
participation constraint may make it impossible to sustain the ﬁrst-best as an equilibrium
in this way by charging a high enough tax to induce the contract at ζ, directly above γ,
but a small tax is sure to be improve welfare (and, of course, raise revenue in the process).
Suppose now that there are a large number of potential ability-types of entrepreneurs, with
higher ability types having higher probabilities of success. Following the same reasoning
as above, it is clear that the optimal number of entrepreneurs will be ﬁnanced. The lowest
ability entrepreneurs receive their ﬁrst-best level of ﬁnance, and the marginal one will ob-
tain zero proﬁts. Since the banks are able to oﬀer them a separate contract, the probability
of success of the marginal entrepreneur will also reﬂect the probability of repayment to the
bank. This implies that the social proﬁtability of the marginal entrepreneur’s project will
also be zero, so again the optimal number will enter.11
A parallel analysis applies for the case in which it is the low-ability types that are more
likely to succeed, so that p2 <p 1. The separating equilibrium is in this case as shown
in Figure 8, with the low-ability types credit-constrained in the sense that their contract
11 More formally, the zero-proﬁt condition of the marginal entrepreneur implies: ˜ p(˜ aR(˜ B) − (1 +
˜ r)˜ B)−y = 0, where tildes refer to values for the marginal entrepreneur. Since ˜ p(1+˜ r)=( 1+ρ),
this zero-proﬁt condition becomes ˜ p˜ aR(˜ B)−(1+ρ)˜ B−y =0=S(˜ p). Thus, the marginal entrant
earns zero social proﬁt.
19implies under-investment. By essentially the same argument as above, the outcome can
again be improved by imposing a tax on the low interest loans, shifting the low-ability
types from β to a point like ζ. The participation constraint raises somewhat more delicate
issues in this case, since there is no assurance that it does not bite for the low-ability types
in the no-intervention equilibrium. In particular, if there is a spectrum of ability types,
entry will occur until the least proﬁtable type just earns zero proﬁts. The least proﬁtable
type can be of high or a low ability since ability and probability of success work in opposite
directions. In the low-ability entrepreneurs also earn the least proﬁts, correcting for the
under-investment by imposing a tax on credit-constrained entrepreneurs can cause an
oﬀsetting distortion by forcing some of them out of business. With that proviso, however,
the case for a tax on low-interest loans carries through essentially unchanged.
It is striking that the qualitative nature of the optimal policy is the same irrespective of
whether it is the low- or high-ability types that have the greater prospect of success. Since
the ineﬃciency being addressed involves over-investment in one case and under-investment
in the other, one might have expected a tax and subsidy to be optimal in the two cases. The
key point, however, is that the ineﬃciency is being induced not by setting an inappropriate
interest rate but by a distortion in the amount of credit being made available, The tax acts
not directly on investment, but on the self-selection constraint that induces the ineﬃciency.
By making the low interest loans less attractive, the tax weakens the incentive constraint—
making the low interest loan less attractive to the low-p type—and so shifts the equilibrium
to the social optimum.
Moral Hazard
Suppose ﬁnally that entrepreneurs can aﬀect the probability of success of their projects
by exerting variable amounts of eﬀort. For simplicity, projects all earn the same return R
if successful (the de Meza-Webb case). Let the probability of success be given by θ(p,e),
where p is the project’s ‘endowed’ probability and e is eﬀort. The function θ(p,e)i s
increasing and strictly concave. If the cost per unit of eﬀort is constant and normalized to
unity, entrepreneurial proﬁts, analogous to (1) in the basic model, become:
π(p) = max
{e}
{θ(p,e)[R − (1 + r)B] − e − y} (22)
The ﬁrst-order condition for the entrepreneur’s eﬀort decision is:
θe[R − (1 + r)B] − 1 = 0 (23)
Social surplus generated by a given entrepreneur’s project is given by:
s(p)=θ(p,e)R − (1 − θ(p,e))c − e − (1 + ρ)B − y
20which is the analogue to (3). Therefore, socially optimal eﬀort satisﬁes:
∂s(p)
∂e
= θe[R + c] − 1=0
Comparing this with (23), we see that the entrepreneur takes too little eﬀort compared
to the socially optimal level. However, since the government cannot observe eﬀort, it is
unable to implement a corrective policy.
There will again be a marginal project now with success probability θ(˜ p,e), where e is
determined endogenously by the entrepreneur. Using (22), the marginal project satisﬁes:
π(˜ p)=θ(˜ p,e)[R − (1 + r)B] − e − y =0
where e is chosen optimally. Using the banks’ zero-expected-proﬁt condition, θ(1 + r)B −
(1 − θ)c − (1 − ρ)B = 0, the social proﬁtability of the marginal project becomes:
s(˜ p)=θ(˜ p,e)R − (1 − θ(˜ p,e))c − e − (1 + ρ)B − y =[ θ(˜ p,e) − θ]((1 + r)B − c)) < 0
where θ(˜ p,e) − θ<0, analogous to the basic de Meza and Webb case. Therefore, the
addition of variable eﬀort does not change the qualitative results about over-investment.
The government is unable to correct for variable eﬀort since eﬀort cannot be observed.
8. Conclusions
The starting point for this paper was the ﬁnding that when banks fund projects of unknown
quality at a common interest rate, either under- or over-investment could occur depending
on whether the pooled projects have the same expected return (the Stiglitz-Weiss case) or
the same return if successful (the de Meza-Webb case). Depending on which case prevails,
policy intervention can call for a subsidy or a tax on loans. We have investigated the nature
of ineﬃciency and the case for policy intervention in credit markets under alternative, more
general assumptions. When project characteristics in a given loan pool can include various
combinations of return R and probability of success p, there will generally be under-
investment in projects with low R and high p, and over-investment in projects with high
R and low p. In principle, a progressive tax system on ex post returns will be eﬃciency
improving, although it is diﬃcult to implement. Once entrepreneurs are oﬀered the choice
of loan and equity ﬁnance, the ambiguity disappears. High-R projects opt for debt ﬁnance,
low-R projects opt for equity ﬁnance, and there will be unambiguously too many projects
of each type undertaken. In these circumstances, a tax on all new projects would be
eﬃciency-improving. This will also be the case if ﬁnancial contracts are contingent on ex
post returns.
If banks are able to separate projects of various qualities, these ineﬃciencies are mitigated.
The mitigation is partial when higher quality projects are able to signal their quality to
21the banks at a cost. There will, however, still be an ineﬃcient number of projects funded
among those projects that do not signal and are pooled together. If the banks are able
to oﬀer separating contracts by requiring either varying amounts of collateral or variable
sizes of loans, there will no longer be an ineﬃcient number of projects funded. Instead,
there will be ineﬃciency in the size of the project, and this ineﬃciency can be reduced by
imposing a tax on low-interest loans.
These results depend on a number of simplifying assumptions that are common to the
literature and designed to focus attention on the consequences of imperfect information
about project quality. For example, both entrepreneurs and creditors are assumed to be
risk-neutral thereby ruling out risk-sharing as a function of credit markets. As well, for
the most part we have assumed away eﬀort on the part of either the entrepreneurs or the
intermediaries. Moreover, we have ruled out ex ante monitoring activities of the banks as
a means of improving their information. These would all be interesting extensions.
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Figure 1. Credit Market Ineﬃciency with Debt Finance
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